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This paper looks at 10 years of reviews in a multidiscipli-
nary journal, The Journal of Artificial Societies and
Social Simulation (JASSS), which is the flagship journal
of social simulation. We measured referee behavior and
referees’ agreement. We found that the disciplinary
background and the academic status of the referee have
an influence on the report time, the type of recommen-
dation and the acceptance of the reviewing task. Refer-
ees from the humanities tend to be more generous in
their recommendations than other referees, especially
economists and environmental scientists. Second, we
found that senior researchers are harsher in their judg-
ments than junior researchers, and the latter accept
requests to review more often and are faster in
reporting. Finally, we found that articles that had been
refereed and recommended for publication by a multi-
disciplinary set of referees were subsequently more
likely to receive citations than those that had been
reviewed by referees from the same discipline. Our
results show that common standards of evaluation can
be established even in multidisciplinary communities.
Introduction
Reviewing for journals is a kind of moral duty in the sci-
entific community, being instrumental to the Mertonian ethi-
cal norms that regulate science as an organized institution
(Huutoniemi 2015; Merton 1942). We know that the quality
of our publications depends at least partially on comments
and suggestions given by competent and cooperative refer-
ees (e.g., Mulligan, Hall, & Raphael, 2013). On the other
hand, we know that science is a public good that can be
maintained only if we are unbiased in judgment and collabo-
rate in distributing efficiently and more or less equally the
reviewing effort (e.g., Hochberg, Chase, Gotelli, Hastings,
& Naeem, 2009).
Given that review standards are not formalized and our
decisions are typically confidential, it is likely that the way
we accomplish this duty may depend on our background and
experience, as well as on our commitment to the journal that
asked our opinion. Given the lack of training on reviewing,
the opacity of the process, and the weak incentives for refer-
ees, the way we review and the time we take to accomplish
this important task might depend on attitudes and norms that
can reflect the attitudes of the other members of our scientific
community (e.g., Azar, 2008; Squazzoni & Gandelli, 2013).
This means that looking at referee behavior could poten-
tially help to reveal scientist misbehavior or situations where
referees could benefit from their gatekeeping role at the
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expense of editors and/or authors (e.g., Bornmann, Wey-
muth, & Daniel, 2010; Lamont, 2009; Garcıa, Rodriguez-
Sanchez & Fdez-Valdivia, 2015); it could also inform us
about the nature of the social norms of reviewing and so
help to counterbalance possible bias (e.g., Bornmann &
Daniel, 2009a; Demarest, Zhang, & Sugimoto, 2014; Lee,
Sugimoto, Zhang, & Cronin, 2013; Mahoney, 1977; Sugi-
moto & Cronin, 2013), especially in multidisciplinary jour-
nals where heterogeneous norms coexist and could conflict
(e.g., Huutoniemi, Thompson Klein, Bruun, & Hukkinen,
2010). Observing the behavior of referees is even more
important for multidisciplinary journals, in which problems
of incompatible standards of judgment can arise.
This paper aims to understand these problems empirically
by looking at 10 years of reviews in a multidisciplinary,
online journal, The Journal of Artificial Societies and Social
Simulation (JASSS) (see: http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/
JASSS.html). Established in 1998 and indexed in the Insti-
tute for Scientific Information (ISI; now Thomson Reuters),
Scopus, and other major journal databases, JASSS is the
flagship journal of social simulation, that is, the study of
social processes through computer simulation. Given that it
typically publishes contributions by social scientists, econo-
mists, computer scientists, and other specialists often in col-
laboration, who apply computer simulation to analyze a
wide range of complex social processes, from opinion
dynamics to market behavior, JASSS is ideal for looking at
situations where referees from different disciplinary back-
grounds remotely collaborate to judge multidisciplinary sub-
missions (e.g., Meyer, Lorscheid, & Troitzsch 2009;
Squazzoni & Casnici, 2013).
The journal received 1,272 submissions and published
606 articles and 236 book reviews from 1st January 1998 to
24th February 2015. The rejection rate for submitted articles
increased as a proportion of the total article submissions
from 50% in 2006 to 75% in 2015. It applies a double-blind
model of peer review, has an average decision time of 60
days from author submission to the editorial decision, and
an average report time by referees of 30 days, all rounds
included, for example, first, second, or more rounds of
reviews. It is truly international, as about 20% of first sub-
mission authors come from the US, 13% from the UK, 10%
from Germany, 9% from China, and the rest worldwide,
from Japan to Australia (source: internal journal statistics).
In order to look at peer review empirically, we measured
referee behavior, that is, time to report, recommendation,
and length of the report, and looked at the implications of
their disciplinary background, academic status, and position
in the journal’s editorial board. We also measured the degree
of agreement about the recommendations.
We found that the disciplinary background and the aca-
demic status of the referee have an influence on the report
time and the recommendation. By measuring the degree of
consensus among referees and the number of citations of
published articles, we found that combining referees from
different disciplines was beneficial in selecting highly suc-
cessful articles.
This suggests that common standards of evaluation can
be developed even outside single disciplines. This is impor-
tant especially in fields, such as social simulation, that have
a strong, multidisciplinary nature and so require the integra-
tion of competent disciplinary judgments.
Methods
Data included 10 years of peer review in JASSS from
2001 to 2011. Data were extracted on 12 May 2012 from the
system used by the journal to manage submissions and
reviewing, epress (http://www.epress.ac.uk), with the agree-
ment of the journal editor at the time. They included 915
submissions as well as information on 1,819 authors and ref-
erees, that is, 581 who were both authors and referees, 921
authors who had never refereed for the journal, and 317 ref-
erees who had not authored a submission. For the sake of
comparability, we restricted our analysis to the first round of
reviews. We excluded from the data set all submissions
before 2001, that is, the first 5 years of the journal, in which
some submissions were invited and rejections were rare, and
all those submitted after 2011 because some of these were
still under review as of 12 May 2012.
For each submission, we had: referee names and recom-
mendations, that is, acceptance, minor or major revisions, or
rejection; time taken by each referee to report; and editorial
decision. For each personal record, we had: disciplinary
background; status (e.g., full/associate professor, private
researcher, or junior researcher); whether a member of the
journal’s editorial board; affiliation; and a rating of referee
quality assigned by the editor. With regard to referees’ disci-
plinary background, a classification was performed by hand
from the biographical information included in the database,
augmented as required using a Google search.
Most submissions were reviewed by two or three peers
(in 45% and 44% of the cases, respectively) and only a few
by four referees or just one (2% and 9%, respectively). Ref-
erees only rarely recommended accepting submissions at the
first round (9%), mostly asking authors to revise and resub-
mit (40%), while rejections and minor revisions were recom-
mended nearly equally often (25% and 26%, respectively).
In order to measure the quality of the referee reports, we
considered the length of the text and the number of days
spent by referees for reporting. The length was calculated by
summing the number of words of the report’s text, excluding
all review guidelines included in the journal’s review format
and possible pleasantries used by the referees when report-
ing via e-mail (in such cases, the text was copied and pasted
manually from the e-mails by the journal editor in the epress
management tool). We excluded 25% of referee reports,
as they were directly evaluated by journal editors or due to
missing recommendations or text. We assumed that the
length of the referee text was a proxy for the quality of infor-
mation provided by the referee. The length of reports is criti-
cal in two cases: (a) when referees recommend revisions, as
authors expect to find suggestions to improve the quality of
their submission, and (b) when referees recommended
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rejection, as in these cases referees are expected to provide
justifications for their opinions to editors and authors.
As an external validation of this measure of quality, we
used the internal ratings of referees provided by the journal
editors. Note that this was possible only when reports were
submitted via e-mail and not directly through the epress
management platform. The internal ratings were signifi-
cantly correlated with the length of the reports (Kruskal–
Wallis p-value< .05). We also included the time that the ref-
eree took to respond because providing responses quickly to
authors is essential to avoid delaying publication and so is
commonly perceived as an indicator of quality by authors
(e.g., Hartonen & Alava, 2013).
Results
Table 1 shows report length by recommendation. Not
only was length not normally distributed among the referee
reports (Shapiro–WilkW test p < .05); it was also dependent
on the type of recommendation (Kruskal–Wallis p < .05).
Reports where referees recommended accepting the submis-
sion or asked for minor revisions were shorter than average,
and reports where referees asked for major revisions were
longer (Dunn’s post-hoc test1). This confirms that the length
of the report was viewed by the referees as a means of pro-
viding detail both to editors and authors to justify their opin-
ion and/or to share comments and suggestions to improve
the quality of the authors’ work. Although time for reporting
was also not normally distributed (Shapiro–Wilk W test p <
.05), a Kruskal–Wallis test showed no differences between
the recommendations in terms of days spent by referees for
reporting (Kruskal–Wallis p5 .23).
Table 2 compares the 301 recommendations of referees
who were members of the journal’s editorial or management
boards with the 1,387 recommendations from external refer-
ees. External referees rejected a higher proportion of the
submissions they were sent than board members. Members
of the editorial board were faster in reporting and tended to
write shorter reports when recommending acceptance (11
days against 23 days, Wilcoxon p < .05). When they recom-
mended rejection, they were faster than external referees (18
days against 28 days, Wilcoxon p < .05). When asking for
major revisions, they wrote longer reports than external ref-
erees and did so more quickly (24 days against 28 days, Wil-
coxon p < .05). A learning or commitment effect could
account for these differences if members of the board were
capable of detecting the quality of an author’s submission
more quickly than external referees or were more inclined to
provide reviews of high quality to maintain the prestige of
the journal.
In order to check for possible bias due to reciprocity strat-
egies (e.g., Squazzoni, Bravo, & Takacs, 2013; Squazzoni &
Gandelli, 2013), we looked at situations where referees had
previously submitted to, or had published an article in the
journal before being asked to review a submission. A previ-
ous negative experience as an author could have brought ref-
erees to reciprocate by rejecting a subsequent submission or
a positive experience could have led referees to be more
selective in order to defend the prestige of the journal in
which they had already published.
Contrary to these hypotheses, we found no trace of strate-
gic behavior by referees. We found that the recommendation
was associated neither with having previously submitted
(chi-square p < .05 but Kruskal gamma520.09) nor to
being previously published (chi-square p5 .64). The only
differences were that (a) unpublished authors tended to send
shorter reports in case of recommending acceptance and
rejection (Wilcoxon p < .05) and (b) published authors
tended to send longer reports when recommending rejection
(Wilcoxon p < .05).
Then we looked at possible disciplinary-specific attitudes
of referees. We found a consistent correlation between the
referees’ disciplinary background and their recommendations
(Cramer’s V5 0.12, p 5< .05). Referees from the human-
ities tended to give more favorable evaluations than referees
having other disciplinary backgrounds: 58% recommended
acceptance or minor revisions compared with 23% for econ-
omists, 24% for geographers, and 28% for environmental sci-
entists. Referees from economics were more inclined to
reject submissions and, together with geographers, were in
general more demanding than other referees, recommending
a higher percentage of rejections and major revisions (in
76% and 77% of the cases, respectively) (Figure 1).
TABLE 1. Report length by recommendation.
Recommendation
Report
length
(words) Std. Err.
[95%
Conf. Interval]
Accepted 301.0 29.2 243.7 358.4
Minor revisions 528.9 18.7 492.1 565.6
Major revisions 696.7 17.6 662.0 731.4
Rejected 534.8 19.4 496.6 572.9
TABLE 2. Recommendation by editorial board members versus exter-
nal referees.
Recommendation
Editorial
board
Management
board
External
referees
Accepted 10%
(22)
13%
(9)
9%
(121)
Minor revisions 28%
(63)
34%
(25)
25%
(352)
Major revisions 39%
(90)
34%
(25)
40%
(559)
Rejected 23%
(53)
19%
(14)
26%
(355)
Total 100%
(228)
100%
(73)
(100%
(1387)
Note. The absolute values are reported in parentheses. The edito-
rial board consisted of appointed experts and the management board
included the journal, forum, and book review editors.
1Dunn’s test (Dunn 1964) is a post-hoc pairwise multiple compari-
sons procedure appropriate to follow the rejection of a Kruskal–Wallis
test.
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This could be due to the development of heterogene-
ous standards of judgment across different disciplines
(e.g., Lamont, 2009). For instance, economists have
developed a common understanding of what a formal
model of the economy should look like, and so could
judge submissions against this benchmark, while scholars
from the humanities generally do not share a common
view of the foundations of their disciplines (e.g.,
Richiardi, Leombruni, Saam, & Sonnessa, 2006). Given
the special situation of JASSS, which often publishes
articles on economic models by noneconomists (e.g.,
computer scientists), this might explain the severity of
judgment by economist referees.
We also found disciplinary-specific variations in revision
time and report length. The average time for reporting varied
significantly among referees of different disciplinary back-
grounds (Kruskal–Wallis p < .05). While referees from
math and medicine submitted their reports more promptly
(respectively, 16 and 19 days on average), physicists, envi-
ronmental scientists, and economists took more time to com-
plete their reports, spending 31 days on average (Table 3;
there is more detail about these differences for each pair of
disciplines in Table A1 in the Appendix). This is in line with
recent findings on norms of time delay in economics (e.g.,
Azar, 2008; Ellison, 2002). The same is true for the report
length, which varied significantly between referees of differ-
ent disciplinary backgrounds (Kruskal–Wallis p < .05; more
detail about the differences for each pair of disciplines can
be found in Table A2 in the Appendix).
Referees having a background in management, environ-
mental sciences, or social sciences tended to provide longer
reports than mathematicians, computer scientists, and geog-
raphers (Table 4). This could reflect different norms in the
former set of disciplines, where submissions are typically
longer, and so, most likely, are the length of typical reviews.
Differences were also found in the relationship between
the academic status of the referees and the recommendations
they made (the two variables were significantly associated;
FIG. 1. Recommendations related to the disciplinary backgrounds of the referees. The area of the disks indicates the percentage of reviews for each
recommendation. The total column indicates the number of reviews by reviewers from each disciplinary background.
TABLE 3. Revision time and disciplinary background.
Background
Revision
time
Std.
Err.
[95%
Conf. Interval]
Humanities 23.05 2.21 18.72 27.38
Social sciences 27.07 1.49 24.15 29.99
Behavioral sciences 27.57 1.93 23.78 31.36
Physics 31.26 2.99 25.40 37.12
Environmental sciences 31.85 2.66 26.63 37.07
Computer sciences/
Engineering
24.75 0.92 22.95 26.55
Math 15.50 2.32 10.95 20.05
Geography 31.39 3.26 25.01 37.78
Medicine 19.38 3.95 11.63 27.13
Economics 29.31 1.68 26.01 32.60
Management 26.24 1.93 22.45 30.02
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chi-square 14.8, p5 .022). Academic researchers were less
likely to recommend acceptance than nonacademic research-
ers. While referees doing research in the private sector recom-
mended acceptance of 18% of submissions, junior academic
researchers and professors recommended acceptance in only
the 8% of the cases. While junior academic researchers were
more inclined towards recommending major revisions, full/
associate professors were more severe and tended to reject
more submissions than their colleagues. There is a general
pattern that links seniority and selectivity, irrespective of the
disciplinary context of the referees (Table 5).
Differences were also found in the lengths of reports,
which were strongly correlated with the referee’s status
(Kruskal–Wallis p < .05). Junior researchers tended to write
longer reports. In this respect, there is a robust statistical dif-
ference between professors and junior researchers in terms
of report length (Dunn’s post-hoc p < .05), as well as
between private and junior researchers (Dunn’s post-hoc p
< .05), whereas the difference between private researchers
and professors was not statistically significant. The standard
error of the length of reports by private researchers was
higher due to the heterogeneity of this category, which
includes all researchers not performing research in an aca-
demic institute or a public research center, for example,
researchers in private companies or foundations, consultants,
and research-based entrepreneurs (Table 6).
Another status-influenced difference was found in the
time taken to report. While academic professors took an
average of 28 days to report and private researchers took 27
days, juniors took 25 days. However, only the difference
between professors and junior researchers was statistically
significant (Dunn’s post-hoc p < .05). Combined with the
previous finding, this means that junior researchers tended
to complete their reports more quickly and with more con-
tent than more senior colleagues. This may be because jun-
ior researchers are motivated to take the reviewing task
more seriously both as a means for learning and for building
a reputation with the journal’s editor for future submissions
(Table 7).
Junior researchers tended to refuse requests to review less
frequently than academic professors and private researchers,
although they had more requests (Table 8).
Furthermore, there is a significant effect of the discipli-
nary background of the referees on agreeing to review
(Table 9). More specifically, refusals were less frequent
when referees were experts in medicine, computer science,
or humanities, whereas they were more frequent for econo-
mists and physicists.
Finally, we measured the degree of alignment between
referees who were assigned to the same submission. We
assigned a number to recommendations: accept (1), minor
revision (2), major revision (3), and reject (4), and calculated
the standard deviation of the referees’ recommendations.
The principle was that the higher the standard deviation
between the numbers of the n recommendations (n5 the
TABLE 4. Report length and disciplinary background.
Background
Revision
length Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Humanities 551.2 45.9 461.1 641.4
Social sciences 648.0 29.8 589.4 706.6
Behavioral sciences 576.6 38.7 500.6 652.5
Physics 533.8 40.5 454.3 613.2
Environmental sciences 662.3 45.2 573.6 751.0
Computer sciences/
Engineering
545.6 17.7 510.8 580.5
Math 497.0 72.8 354.0 639.9
Geography 514.7 44.2 427.9 601.5
Medicine 544.0 67.8 410.9 677.2
Economics 541.6 26.7 489.1 594.1
Management 668.1 42.7 584.2 751.9
TABLE 5. Status and type of recommendation.
Referee status Accepted
Minor
revision
Major
revision Rejected
Full/associate professors 62 193 278 194
8.5% 26.6% 38.2% 26.7%
Junior researchers 64 200 342 194
8.0% 25.0% 42.8% 24.3%
Private researchers 18 26 34 22
18.0% 26.0% 34.0% 22.0%
Note. Junior researchers are PhD students, post-docs, and all those
not yet having a permanent academic position. Private researchers are
all referees doing research in the private and nonacademic sector, for
example, researchers in business companies, consultants, or research-
based entrepreneurs.
TABLE 6. Status and report length.
Referee status Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Full/associate
professors
534.20 14.76 505.25 563.15
Junior researchers 622.98 16.17 591.27 654.70
Private researchers 532.57 36.23 461.50 603.64
TABLE 7. Referee status and revision time.
Referee status Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Full/associate
professors
28.21 0.94 26.37 30.05
Junior researchers 25.23 0.74 23.78 26.69
Private researchers 27.63 2.09 23.53 31.73
TABLE 8. Decisions on reviewing requests by status (“refusals”
includes those who were asked but did not reply).
Status
Number of
requests
Number of
refusals % Refusals
Professors 1,178 145 12.3
Junior researchers 1,222 112 9.7
Private researchers 162 19 11.7
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number of referees who were assigned to the same submis-
sion), the more the reviews were misaligned. We excluded
all submissions assigned to only one referee.
Table 10 shows the disciplinary composition of the ref-
eree pools asked to evaluate the journal submissions.
Eighty-two percent of the referee pools included referees
coming from at least two different disciplinary backgrounds;
28% had referees from three different disciplines.
The number of referees with different disciplinary back-
grounds assigned to the same submission had no impact
on the probability of recommendations being aligned
(Kruskal–Wallis p5 .58). Similarly, having a group of ref-
erees with different status who were asked to evaluate the
same submission had no impact on the consensus between
referees (Kruskal–Wallis p5 .29). This suggests that, by
involving referees with different degrees of seniority and
sector of specialization, a submission could benefit from
more informative reports and quicker response times by
junior researchers while at the same time taking advantage
of the more learned judgment by senior researchers (e.g.,
see Tables 6 and 7).
The fact that a consistent degree of consensus was reached
between referees on the microscale of the single submission,
independently of their heterogeneous disciplinary back-
grounds, would contradict recent findings on disagreement
among referees in peer review (e.g., Bornmann & Daniel,
2009a, 2009b; Kravitz et al., 2010; Lee, 2012). The journal
editor tended to accept or reject submissions only when the
disagreement between referees was low. When referees dis-
agreed about their recommendations, the editors usually
opted for a minor or major revision and assigned a second
round of reviews to the submission (Kruskal–Wallis p < .05;
there is more detail on the post-hoc analysis in Table A3 in
the Appendix). Therefore, the combination of referees of dif-
ferent disciplinary backgrounds asked to evaluate the same
submission probably reduced disciplinary bias (e.g., Chubin
& Hackett, 1990; Lee, 2012, Grimaldo & Paolucci, 2013).
By determining the number of citations received by
accepted articles, as recorded by Google Scholar, we found
that articles that have been reviewed by a multidisciplinary
referee group had more success in terms of citations. Not
only was the multidisciplinary nature of the referee group
helpful for editor’s judgment, it also probably generated
important knowledge that improved the quality of submis-
sions (Table 11).
Discussion and Conclusions
These findings help to cast new light on old matters con-
cerning the quality of peer review, the evaluation of multi-
disciplinary work, and the typical behavior of referees.
Although limited to one case study, they help us to recon-
sider certain bad signals about the quality of peer review
that have come from recent scandals where misbehavior by
authors was combined with unreliability by referees (e.g.,
Alberts, Hanson, & Kelner 2008; Couzin, 2006; Crocker &
Cooper, 2011).
This is important especially if the multiple functions of
peer review are considered. Peer review is a means for
selecting scientific work through criteria of excellence and
avoiding publishing submissions that undermine the prestige
and standards of a journal. However, it is also a way to
improve the quality of scientific work through anonymous,
decentralized collaboration (e.g., Jeggins, 2006). In our case,
it is evident that these two functions, which often might cre-
ate ambiguity in reviewers’ interpretations of their task, har-
monize positively.
First, the findings show that common standards of evalu-
ation can be developed even in multidisciplinary journals
that call upon expert referees from a variety of fields who
might have different standards of judgment. Although there
is evidence of disagreement among the referees, we found
TABLE 9. Decisions on reviewing requests by disciplinary background
(“refusals” includes those who were asked but did not reply).
Disciplinary background
of the referees
Number
of requests
Number
of refusals % Refusals
Humanities 152 12 7.9
Social sciences 430 46 10.7
Behavioral sciences 199 26 13.1
Physics 162 26 16.1
Environmental sciences 122 15 12.3
Computer sciences/
engineering
742 53 7.1
Math 42 4 9.5
Geography 76 8 10.5
Medicine 35 1 2.9
Economics 400 64 16.0
Management 199 21 10.6
TABLE 10. Disciplinary composition of reviews.
Disciplinary composition Number Percentage
Mono-disciplinary referee pool 112 18.1
Multidisciplinary referee pool 506 81.8
Referees pool with two disciplinary
backgrounds
362 71.5
Referees pool with three disciplinary
backgrounds
141 27.8
Referees with four disciplinary
backgrounds
3 0.5
TABLE 11. Relationship between number of citations received by pub-
lished articles and mono versus multidisciplinarity of the referees.
Nature of the
reviewing Number
Mean
citations
Std.
Err. [95%
Conf.
Interval]
Mono-disciplinary 129 18.46 2.21 14.08 22.84
Multidisciplinary 48 29.43 6.49 16.36 42.50
Note. Mono-disciplinary reviewing refers to submissions being
reviewed by two or more referees from the same discipline, while multi-
disciplinary reviewing refers to submissions being reviewed by two or
more referees from different disciplines (data source: Google Scholar).
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that the journal editor’s tendency to match submissions with
a diverse set of referees, for both disciplinary background
and seniority, was instrumental in evaluating multidiscipli-
nary submissions fairly. This would confirm the importance
of carefully selecting referees in peer review and ensuring a
diversity of criteria of judgment and opinions (e.g., Ferreira
et al., 2015).
Furthermore, citation analysis confirmed that being
subject to multidisciplinary reviews can be beneficial for
the success of multidisciplinary articles. Obviously, the
positive effect of diversity on judgment and impact of
submissions could have been due to the multidisciplinary
nature of submissions more than to the quality and fair-
ness of the peer-review process they had been exposed to
(e.g., Levitt & Thelwall, 2008). However, it is important
that a journal’s evaluation process reflects and magnifies,
rather than suppresses multidisciplinary research (e.g.,
Huutoniemi, 2015).
Second, previous studies suggested the importance of
motivations of reciprocity in explaining referee behavior.
Reciprocity may have a bright or a dark side. For
instance, in a laboratory experiment, Squazzoni, Bravo,
and Takacs (2013) found that reciprocity can cause refer-
ees to behave fairly and keep evaluation standards high,
in the hope of future benefits from the quality of the pro-
cess when they become authors. On the other hand,
Squazzoni and Gandelli (2013) found that reciprocity
motives by referees can be beneficial only when referees
consider the quality of peer review they have been
exposed to more than the fact that they have been previ-
ously published or rejected.
However, in this study we found no trace of such strategic
behavior by referees. Previous positive or negative experien-
ces as authors did not help to predict subsequent referee
behavior and so did not affect the recommendations and time
to report. However, the specificity of JASSS, which includes
scientists who have different backgrounds but share a com-
mon approach and method of analysis, that is, agent-based
models of social interaction, and which is targeted to a rela-
tively small and so probably cohesive scientific community
must be borne in mind. Moreover, not only do researchers
from social simulation constitute a relatively small scientific
community; the vivid associational life that characterizes the
community, with three large associations, that is, the Euro-
pean Social Simulation Association, the Computational
Social Science Society of the Americas, and the Pacific-
Asian Association for Agent-based Approach in Social Sys-
tems Sciences, each quite active in organizing events and
creating a cohesive community worldwide, could explain the
cooperative tendency and the lack of misbehavior by refer-
ees. This could indicate that features of the organization of
the scientific community could have a significant effect on
scientists’ behavior in peer review and so have important
implications for the quality of the process. On the other hand,
it must be said that all empirical analyses of peer review in
scholarly journals are context-dependent, due to the com-
plexity and variety of scientific research and the lack of
large-scale, systematic, or comparative studies that could
help with identifying general trends (Siler, Lee, & Bero,
2015).
Finally, it is important to note that empirical analysis of
peer review is still in its infancy. This is due to some
resistance to scrutiny, accountability, and openness by
many of the stakeholders involved, for example, funding
agencies, publishers, and journal editors (e.g., Couzin-
Frankel, 2013). Establishing the sharing of data on peer
review at a large scale is the only means to make system-
atic analysis of this important institution possible. While
improvements in transparency and ethical standards are
important to reduce potential bias and increase the
accountability and legitimacy of peer review (e.g., Bosch,
Hernandex, Pericas, Doti, & Marusic, 2012; Wager, 2010;
Wager, Fiack, Graf, Robinson, & Rowlands, 2009), the
degree of openness of journals towards sharing internal
data and performing systematic analyses of their internal
procedures should become a required element to certify
their quality. This would stimulate scientists to look at
journals not only through the lens of their impact factor,
which is often a misleading guide to judging journal qual-
ity, but also their contributions to preserving the normative
foundations of science as an open, transparent, and civiliz-
ing system in a world of increasing competitive pressures.
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Appendix
TABLE A1. Dunn’s post-hoc analysis on report time and referee background.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 21.95 22.39 20.87 22.93 21.59 20.68 23.60 22.44 21.49 20.82
3 22.39 20.87 22.93 21.59 20.68 23.60 22.44 21.49 20.82 21.52
4 22.93 21.59 20.68 23.60 22.44 21.49 20.82 21.52 0.81 1.54
5 23.60 22.44 21.49 20.82 21.52 0.81 1.54 2.26 3.10 1.52
6 21.52 0.81 1.54 2.26 3.10 1.52 2.84 3.14 3.52 4.01
7 1.52 2.84 3.14 3.52 4.01 2.58 22.89 21.79 21.09 20.54
8 22.89 21.79 21.09 20.54 0.15 22.26 23.55 0.81 1.99 2.33
9 0.81 1.99 2.33 2.70 3.19 1.72 20.52 2.83 22.72 21.07
10 22.72 21.07 0.00 0.77 1.67 22.00 23.31 1.18 22.44 21.86
11 21.86 20.14 0.65 1.32 2.12 20.80 22.79 1.60 21.98 0.76
Note. Headers indicate the referee background: 15 humanities, 25 social sciences, 35 behavioral sciences, 45 physics, 55 environmental sci-
ences, 65 computer sciences/engineering, 75mathematics, 85 geography, 95medicine, 105 economics, 115management.
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TABLE A2. Dunn’s post-hoc analysis on report length and referee background.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 22.15 20.85 1.24 20.03 2.09 0.81 22.49 20.96 21.79 22.45
3 20.85 1.24 20.03 2.09 0.81 22.49 20.96 21.79 22.45 20.35
4 20.03 2.09 0.81 22.49 20.96 21.79 22.45 20.35 2.82 0.76
5 22.49 20.96 21.79 22.45 20.35 2.82 0.76 20.30 2.79 0.61
6 20.35 2.82 0.76 20.30 2.79 0.61 1.97 1.19 0.63 2.34
7 0.61 1.97 1.19 0.63 2.34 0.88 20.45 1.09 0.21 20.42
8 20.45 1.09 0.21 20.42 1.60 20.27 20.88 20.75 0.43 20.23
9 20.75 0.43 20.23 20.73 0.93 20.63 21.09 20.35 20.33 2.39
10 20.33 2.39 0.68 20.28 2.59 20.01 20.85 0.25 0.61 22.56
11 22.56 20.79 21.76 22.50 0.28 23.11 22.30 21.51 20.80 22.78
TABLE A3. Dunn’s post-hoc analysis on average agreement
between referees for the type of recommendation.
Acceptance
Minor
revision
Major
revision
Minor review 22.15
0.02
Major review 21.69 1.10
0.05 0.14
Rejected 20.90 2.33 1.54
0.18 0.01 0.06
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